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The Law of Unintended Consequences
Susan Ness*
Whether intentional or not, the 1996 Telecommunications Act ("1996
Act") was transitional legislation, focused largely on the constituencies that
battled before Congress at the time of its passage, with compromises to
address historic realities. Many provisions central to the 1996 Act were
carrots extended to the major players to support (or at least not to oppose)
the legislation.' And Congress failed to seize that unique opportunity to
fundamentally restructure our communications systems in light of the
Internet. That was probably a good thing, given the law of unintended
consequences.
To be sure, the 1996 Act has lofty, enduring principles-competition
deregulation and universal service-but the tough choices that would
underpin achievement of those principles were intentionally left vague as
Congress punted to the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to
resolve those sticky issues.
Congress intended the 1996 Act to be a catalyst for the expansion of
competition in the telecom and cable services markets, both of which had a
*Commissioner Ness served on the FCC from May 1994 through May 2001. She thanks
James L. Casserly, partner Willie, Farr & Gallagher, who served as the Commissioner's
Senior Advisor from 1994 through 1999, for his assistance with this Essay. The views
expressed are her own.
1. For example, broadcasters won greater media consolidation and the possibility of an
exclusive second channel for digital conversion. The Regional Bell operating companies
("RBOCs") were freed from the shackles of the Modification of Final Judgment ("MFJ"),
United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom., 460 U.S. 1001
(1983), providing a path or date certain to enter businesses precluded under the Department
of Justice consent decree and also were authorized to compete in the distribution of video
programming. The competing phone companies secured a regime that was intended to ease
their entry into the local phone business, and the cable operators received relief from rate
regulation for all but their basic tier service. The wireless industry was left alone, free of
state jurisdiction, to continue its deregulated expansion under the 1993 amendments, and the
states were given an adjudicatory role in determining RBOC entry into long distance.
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history of monopoly providers. The efforts to induce competition in the
telecom sector by opening up the RBOC monopoly network to its
competitors were valiant and expensive, but largely ineffectual. The
provisions freeing the RBOCs to offer video services under their choice of
regulatory silos-cable, wireless, common carrier, or a new open video
system-produced very few video systems, and most of those that were
created were later shut down or sold by the RBOCs merging with their
siblings.
The 1996 Act was beneficial in some respects. Telecommunications
prices dropped, and the variety of services available to consumers
expanded. It created the mechanism-the universal service provisions2_
through which over ninety percent of the classrooms in the Nation's
schools have been connected to the Internet. And to speed deregulation, the
1996 Act gave the FCC new tools, including forbearance, regular
comprehensive regulatory reviews, and preemption of state regulation.
The 1996 Act was also flawed, both as drafted by Congress and
implemented by regulators and the courts. The statute was riddled with
ambiguities,3 and many courts failed to give appropriate deference to
reasonable interpretations by the expert agency, thereby leading to years of
unnecessary litigation.4 It did not adequately anticipate the popularity and
uses of the Internet, leaving many tricky structural issues for much later
resolution. 5 It went too far in loosening traditional constraints on media
consolidation, especially radio ownership. Its mandatory biennial review of
all broadcast rules imposed an impossible regulatory burden on the
agency,6 requiring the FCC to revisit its rules before the ink had dried on
earlier changes. And it failed to provide the clarity of vision and
corresponding legal authority for the FCC to take ownership of the digital
television transition.
In some respects, the 1996 Act is given too much credit for things that
were happening with or without this legislation. It was a 1993 statute that
led to the allocation of spectrum for Personal Communications Services
and the auctions that followed, raising billions of dollars for the U.S.,
2. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000).
3. "It would be gross understatement to say that the 1996 Act is not a model of clarity.
It is in many important respects a model of ambiguity or indeed even self-contradiction."
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999).
4. See, e.g., People of the State of Cal. v. FCC, 124 F.3d 934 (8th Cir.), rev'd by, 525
U.S. 366 (1999).
5. See, e.g., Nat'l Cable Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S.Ct. 2688
(2005).
6. Comments by Chief Judge Harry Edwards during oral arguments on Fox challenge
to the 1999 Biennial Review of broadcasting rules. Congress subsequently doubled the
timeframe to every four years.
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Treasury and-more importantly-triggering the wireless competition that
has driven a sevenfold increase in the number of subscribers in just ten
years.7 It was the authorization of direct broadcast satellite ("DBS") a
decade earlier that, in the late nineties, made the two leading satellite
providers established competitors to cable companies. And it was
technology and the Internet, not the 1996 Act, that accelerated the rollout
of Wi-Fi and Wi-Max, as well as the use of mobile phones, MP3s and other
personal entertainment devices to compete with broadcasting, broadband
access, and wireline telephony.
By the same token, the 1996 Act too often is blamed for
developments it did not cause. The decline of long distance as a discrete
service was already underway by the time of the 1996 Act, and it was
hastened by the demise of both WorldCom and AT&T for very different
reasons.8 Economics and technology, not laws or regulatory decisions,
probably are the main reasons that telephone companies have been slow to
enter the video business and cable companies have been slow to enter the
phone business. (That did not stop the companies from trying to pin the
blame for their foot-dragging on the FCC.)
Nonetheless, the 1996 Act is by any measure a landmark:
* Even though the Internet was scarcely understood, Congress
wisely established a national policy that it should be
"unfettered by Federal or State regulation."9
* Congress eliminated the MFJ, allowing the RBOCs to enter
businesses from which they had been barred since 1984.10
" For the first time, the FCC was given explicit power to
forbear from regulations, and even to eliminate statutory
requirements, but only those that apply to
telecommunications services and telecommunications
carriers. It was also required to conduct periodic reviews of
broadcast and telecommunications regulations, but not cable
or wireless, and to eliminate those that are no longer
necessary in the public interest.
* The FCC was empowered to include broadcasters in the
digital transition by assigning them temporary second
7. There are 195 million wireless subscribers in the United States-more than there
are wired subscribers.
8. Sadly, the 2005 mergers of MCI into Verizon and AT&T into SBC eliminated
competitors that were also the most persistent voices challenging the Bell monopolies.
9. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000).
10. Congress probably did not imagine that within a decade, the seven "Baby Bells"
would combine into four, that one of those would absorb (and take the name of) its
estranged parent, AT&T, and that one would absorb its long-time nemesis, MCI.
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channels to begin digital transmissions.
" Consumers were given the right to install satellite dishes and
other reception equipment through the Over-the-Air
Reception Devices ("OTARD") provisions, thereby
enhancing competition in the multichannel video market.
" The rate regulation regime that had stalled cable for several
years was jettisoned, facilitating capital investment in cable
plant for digital channels, video-on-demand, and high-speed
Internet.
One of the most promising features of the 1996 Act was the provision
dealing with schools and libraries. Thanks to Senators Snowe, Rockefeller,
Exon, and Kerrey, as well as President Clinton and Vice President Gore,
schools and libraries across the nation were rescued from being
technological backwaters, where even plain old telephones ("POTs") were
in short supply. Today, cutting-edge technology can be found in inner-city
schools, remote Alaskan libraries, and pretty much every community in the
United States, something that would not have happened without the "e-
rate" discounts. Outrageously, but perhaps predictably, given the size of the
program, some funds were wasted through fraud or mismanagement. But
the value of the e-rate program will endure, as our students emerge from
school better prepared to compete in a global economy. Still to be fulfilled,
however, is the promise of the rural health care benefits of the Snowe-
Rockefeller provisions.
One of the biggest flaws of the 1996 Act was the political
compromise that led to the rapid consolidation of media ownership. The
changes in the rules governing radio were especially ill-advised. Radio was
transformed from a very agile, competitive industry with deep local roots to
a sector dominated by a handful of national players and drained of its
spontaneity. Local news was gutted. While some additional market
consolidation made economic sense, the ability of a single owner to control
more than a thousand stations was probably never contemplated by
Congress or the American public. Technology, in the form of digital
satellite radio and digital audio players, now provides a competitive
alternative to terrestrial radio, and broadcasters are scrambling to respond.
Another unintended consequence of the 1996 Act is the way in which
the prolonged Digital Television ("DTV") transition has delayed freeing up
spectrum vitally needed by first responders. Public safety matters. The
1994 bombing in Oklahoma City taught us that public safety agencies
needed more spectrum and greater system interoperability. Seven years
later, September 11 taught us the same lesson. Unfortunately, the spectrum
set aside for public safety remains hostage to the digital transition.
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In addition, Congress failed to grasp that for digital television to
transition, multiple industries would simultaneously have to engage in their
own, very different digital transitions. Cooperation among the consumer
electronics, cable, DBS, broadcasting, and Intellectual Property ("IP") and
PC industries has been strained by statutory ambiguities and lack of
legislative guidance on the significant issues that divide these sectors.
Congress did not assign the mandate or the power to the FCC to take the
tough steps necessary to secure a speedy and smooth transition. Market
forces were wholly inadequate to get the job done, and consumers today
remain confused or unaware of the transition underway.
Looking back, I can see many lessons that should be learned and
applied to the development and implementation of any successor
legislation.
Judicial review should be centralized in a single forum, hopefully one
with a healthy respect for the judgment calls that must be made by an
expert agency. Local phone competition surely would have been introduced
much faster had the Eighth Circuit not been assigned the initial appeals of
our rulemaking. It took three long years before the Supreme Court righted
that wrongly decided opinion. It took more time still before a second
Eighth Circuit opinion could be reversed by the Supreme Court. And
eleven days after that a D.C. Circuit opinion, which took insufficient
account of what the Supreme Court had just said, dealt another major blow
to the regime governing the telephone companies' duty to provide their
competitors with unbundled network elements ("UNE").11
Facilities-based competition is preferred over resale and similar
arrangements, both because it allows for greater differentiation in service
offerings and because competitors fare better when they control their own
destinies. But as we ruefully learned, a detailed regime of wholesale
regulation is virtually impossible to administer in the face of determined
resistance from incumbent providers. 12 The UNE regime for telephone
competition was carefully designed by Congress and conscientiously
implemented by the FCC and the state commissions. It has consumed vast
quantities of time and energy over the past decade. But it has done little for
consumers. Meanwhile, innovation has produced other ways of getting us
where we need to go. Mobile wireless has grown more competitive with
Plain Old Telephone System ("POTS"), and unlicensed wireless is a
promising example of facilities-based competition. Voice over Internet
Protocol ("VolP") offers another alternative, albeit, relying on an
11. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2000).
12. Even to the point where the RBOCs challenged the constitutionality of the very deal
they had negotiated in the 1996 Act.
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accessible cable and RBOC plant to connect with customers. Municipal
provision of pure broadband may be one way to insure that telephone
companies and cable interests do not charge content providers monopoly
rents to reach the consumer.
Deregulation works-provided it is accompanied by competition. The
only thing worse than a monopoly provider is a deregulated monopoly
provider. Deregulation of wireless in 1993, which shielded the wireless
industry from state and rate regulation, sparked massive investments, and
consumers reaped the benefits. Of course, it helped that Personal
Communications Service ("PCS") was introduced with four to six licensees
per market, and a temporary cap was placed on the maximum mobile
wireless spectrum a company could hold.
Even in a robustly competitive marketplace, there are social policies
like localism, privacy, disability access, emergency service, and universal
service that should be addressed. The marketplace will not do it alone. For
those regulations that are retained, ongoing regulatory oversight and
enforcement cannot be shortchanged.
Sometimes, watching and waiting is a good way to go. For example,
at the time of the AT&T/TCI merger and the FCC's first Section 706
report, some wanted the FCC to impose a detailed regime of wholesale
access for Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"). The FCC decided to hold
back to see how the nascent cable modem service would develop.
Investment and innovation followed and business models changed. Now
consumers are probably better off than they might have been under an
artificial regulatory scheme.
Sometimes, inaction is not nearly so healthy. Intercarrier
compensation was a hot issue when I left the FCC in 2001. We knew it
made no sense to have a regime where the amount one provider pays
another to terminate a call depends on whether it is a neighboring
incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC"), a competitive local exchange
carrier ("CLEC"), an ISP, a commercial mobile radio service ("CMRS")
carrier, or an interexchange carrier ("IXC"). We knew this would create
regulatory distortions and gamesmanship. Yet, several years later, nothing
has been done. Similarly, universal service reform remains a critical issue
with a funding mechanism based on revenues from only interstate carriage,
which defies marketplace reality.
Do not pick winners and losers. Technological and competitive
neutrality should be the goal. We do not have different regulatory regimes
for wireless depending on whether a given provider uses Global System for
Mobile Communications ("GSM"), time division multiple access
("TDMA"), or code division multiple access ("CDMA")--or Evolution-
Data Optimized ("EV-DO"). Technology changes too fast to base
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regulation on a specific technology, and regulators should not skew
outcomes anyway.
Think, and think again, before imposing regulatory restrictions. Many
of the things that seem important when lobbyists are pressing their case
turn out to be inconsequential within the not-too-distant future.
And finally, keep the public in the forefront of the debate. That is not
always easy to do, but it is crucial.
The future of U.S. communications is bright. Consumers will
continue to insist on even greater freedom to communicate-to access their
data, their music, their pictures, their video-no matter where they are or
what they are doing. And they are going to want to be able to access these
things seamlessly from multiple platforms.
Looking at the marketplace today and the changes that are underway,
we finally have the facilities-based competition between the RBOCs and
cable providers for voice, video, and data services that the authors of the
1996 Act had hoped for. We also have the real possibility of multiple
providers, using multiple platforms, and competing to deliver the services
that consumers want. At home, depending upon their geographic location,
consumers eventually may be able to pick and choose among a telephone
company, a cable company, an overbuilder, several wireless companies,
satellite companies, a broadband over powerline company, and municipal
and other Wi-Fi or Wi-Max providers. If that vision comes to pass, then the
"law of unintended consequences" may be adjudged to have succeeded
after all.
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